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POLICING HATRED: POLICE BIAS UNITS AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF HATE CRIME
Jeannine Bell*
Much of the scholarly debate about hate crime laws focuses on a dis-
cussion of their constitutionality under the First Amendment. Part of a
larger empirical study of police methods of investigating hate crimes,
this Note attempts to shift thinking in this area beyond the existing de-
bate over the constitutionality of hate crime legislation to a discussion
of how low-level criminal justice personnel, such as the police, enforce
hate crime laws. This Note argues that, since hate crimes are an area in
which police have great discretion in enforcing the law, their under-
standing of the First Amendment and how it relates to their job is im-
portant to the impact that hate crime legislation has in the community.
Additionally, research on the enforcement of hate crime laws may in-
spire further investigation of the broad discretion police officers cur-
rently possess in all areas of law.
September 12, 1912, Willie Perkins of Sheffield, Alabama, a man
described as being "of excellent character, " was walking peace-
fully along a railroad when a party of White men set upon him
for no apparent reason, chased and hounded him; and finally
murdered him. A grand jury decided not to make an indictment
for the murder.1
On November 13, 1988 in Portland, Oregon, a group of skin-
heads in the White Aryan Resistance movement attacked three
Ethiopian immigrants. Amidst shouts of "Fuck you, niggers"
and "Go back to your own country, "the men were viciously
kicked and beaten with a baseball bat until one man, Mulugeta
Seraw, collapsed and died.2
* Book Review Editor, Michigan Journal of Race & Law, Volume 2, 1996-97. A.B.
1991, Harvard-Radcliffe College; M.A. 1995, University of Michigan; J.D. expected
1998, University of Michigan Law School; Ph.D. candidate, Political Science, Univer-
sity of Michigan. I would like to thank Matthew L.M. Fletcher and Julie C. Rodriguez.
1. See Lynched "For Being Black," MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, September 12, 1912,
cited in RALPH GINZBERG, 100 YEARS OF LYNCHINGS 77 (1988).
2. See MORRIS DEES & STEVE FIFFER, HATE ON TRIAL: THE CASE AGAINST AMERICA'S
MOST DANGEROUS NEO-NAZI 3-7 (1993) (detailing the crime and the trials that fol-
lowed).
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INTRODUCTION
Although these cases both involve the selective hunting and
killing of Black men, they differ in one important respect--the sec-
ond was a bias crime and first was not. Bias or hate crime
3
legislation mandates a penalty for the selection of a victim based on
specific prejudices, especially race, religion, ethnicity or sexual ori-
entation.' If the first incident had been prosecuted the perpetrators
would, in all likelihood, have been charged with murder, thus po-
tentially subjecting them to the maximum penalty allowable. In
other words, the killers, identified by a witness as Walt Miller, Tom
Mason, C.L. Baker, Jack Purser, George Stidham and others, could
have received the same sentence for Willie Perkins' murder as they
could have for killing a family member, a business partner, or a
neighbor. Their targeting of Willie Perkins would have played no
part in either the crime with which they were charged or the penalty
to which they were sentenced. The second crime, on the other hand,
is categorized as a bias crime. Oregon instituted a bias crime law in
1981. s The suspects in the second crime, charged with violating the
statute, were sentenced to twice the maximum allowable penalty
that they would have received had they killed a White relative or
business partner under similar circumstances.
Though bias-motivated incidents like the killing of Mulugeta
Seraw are rooted in the nation's origins, spanning the arrival of
Columbus and the legacy of slavery and beyond,6 it is only in the
last two decades that attempts to mitigate bias-motivated hatred
have actually identified targeted groups, condemned crimes
motivated by certain types of prejudice, and prescribed punishment
that exceeds the penalty for similar crimes not motivated by the
delineated prejudices. During the 1980s, several states passed laws
punishing crimes motivated by bias, ranging from cross-burning
statutes to penalty-enhancement laws. Congress passed the Hate
Crime Statistics Act8 in 1990 which required the FBI to collect yearly
statistics on bias crimes from law enforcement agencies around the
country. According to the most recent FBI report in 1994,
3. Hate crime literature uses both "hate" and "bias" to describe crimes motivated by
a variety (including racial, religious, ethnic, and sexual orientation) of prejudices. In
this Note, I will use "hate crime" and "bias crime" interchangeably.
4. The actual prejudices proscribed vary by statute. See discussion infra, Part II.
5. OR. REV. STAT. § 166.165 (1995).
6. See MICHAEL NEWTON & JUDY ANN NEWTON, RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE
IN AMERICA: A CHRONOLOGY (1991) (describing incidents of racial and religious vio-
lence occurring on United States soil since the European discovery of the New World).
7. For a description of statutes, see infra, Part 11.
8. Hate Crime Statistics Act, 23 U.S.C. § 534 note (1993), as amended by Act of July 3,
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-155, § 7, 110 Stat. 1392, 1394 (1996).
[VOL. 2:421
Policing Hatred.
approximately 7400 law enforcement agencies identified a total of
5932 incidents as hate crimes.9
Public awareness that incidents may be hate crimes stems not
only from legal developments that created the category of bias-
motivated violence, but also from police acknowledgment of the
bias motivation behind particular criminal acts. To charge
individuals under most bias crime statutes, police and prosecutors
must produce evidence of bias motivation because many hate crime
statutes require that hate crimes be motivated in part by a proscribed
hatred.10 Therefore, bias crimes exist only when the predicate
offense, that is, the underlying crime, is combined with a bias
motivation. As is the case in most other crimes-murders,
burglaries, rapes-it is the police who are responsible for
investigating and later identifying and classifying bias crimes. The
job of classifying or identifying-naming-in this area is a weighty
task. Because most bias-motivated incidents are placed first in other
crime categories, bias crimes do not legally exist until the police say
they do.
Enforcing bias crime legislation would be much easier if identi-
fying bias crime were like identifying homicide." When the police
find a body, so long as they can determine that the individual's
death was not due to natural causes, accident, or suicide, they can be
fairly certain that a homicide has occurred. While both the type of
homicide and the degree may be in doubt, homicide is the only way
to classify the death of one person caused by another. Identifying
bias crime is more complicated than identifying homicide on two
levels: the factual and the political. Often the only evidence of the
requisite criminal intent is bias-motivated speech, the punishment of
which raises First Amendment issues. The First Amendment com-
plicates officers' tasks by requiring them to decide whether words
uttered during or prior to the commission of a crime are constitu-
tionally protected speech or evidence of unlawful motivation that
can be criminalized under bias crime statutes.
First Amendment issues aside, bias crime classification and
identification can be a difficult task. While assigning bias motivation
is simple in the two examples with which this Note began, other
9. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HATE CRIMES
STATISTICS 5 (1994).
10. See N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 40-c(2) (McKinney 1992); COOK COUNTY STATE
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, A Prosecutor's Guide to Hate Crimes, at IV-2 (1994).
11. The Model Penal Code defines homicides as the killing of one human being by
the act, procurement, or omission of another. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (1962). A
person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negli-
gently causes the death of another human being. Id. Criminal homicide within
criminal codes includes murder, manslaughter or negligent homicide. Id. Homicide,
however, is not always a crime.
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cases are much more challenging. All too often incidents that may be
bias-motivated involve contested stories requiring the police to
"solve" the crimes. Consider the following case from New York City:
On Friday, December 8, 1995, a young man with a revolver
walked into Freddy's Department Store on 125a in Harlem
and began shooting. As store employees ran for cover, the
gunman spayed the store with a flammable liquid. While
the store burned, the gunman shot himself. Eight people,
including the gunman, died in the incident. 
12
As New Yorkers struggled to explain this tragedy some called it
the work of a crazy man; others, a bias crime.13 To some, labeling this
a bias crime makes sense in light of what they consider the relevant
circumstances-that the perpetrator was Black, that the owner of the
store was Jewish, that Black-Jewish relations have declined since the
accidental death of a young Black child was followed by the killing
of a Jewish student, and finally that the Reverend Al Sharpton was
picketing Freddy's in support of a Black-owned store. Those who
dismiss racial animosity as the motivation for the crime say there
was no connection between Sharpton, the landlord-tenant dispute
he was protesting, and the gunman. 4 With the gunman dead the
motivation for the crime is unknown, and classification of the inci-
dent stems only from the perspectives of those classifying it. The
New York City police, charged with upholding both the First
Amendment and New York's bias crime statute, could not afford to
rely on the quick judgment of lay persons.
Concerned with the front lines of hate crime legislation imple-
mentation, this Note argues that police must sort through the
ambiguity and grapple with difficult First Amendment questions to
identify hate crime laws. This Note examines how the police use of-
ficial procedure and everyday practices to negotiate the murky
waters of the First Amendment. In doing so, this Note asserts that
hate crimes exist not only because perpetrators commit them but
also because they are "recognized" by particular police behavior
predicated on organizational procedure, environmental conditions
(e.g., the political nature of the bias crimes), victims' and perpetra-
tors' stories, and police routines. Part I of this Note discusses the
statutory terrain of hate crime legislation that supplies the legal
mandate for police action. Part II surveys the constitutional litera-
ture on bias crimes that addresses the First Amendment questions
12. For a description of this incident see, Robert D. McFadden, Giuliani and Bratton
See Racism in Harlem Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1995, at Al.
13. See Carey Goldberg, Neighbors Play Down Race, Seeing "Act of a Crazy Man,'
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1995, at 20.
14. Id.
[VOL. 2:421
SPRING 1997] Policing Hatred
arising out of bias crime legislation. Part III addresses the question
of how organizational theorists have addressed actors' decision
making within organizations. Part IV focuses on the issue of indi-
vidual-level decision making in the literature on police discretion in
treatment of the law. The Note concludes in Part V with a brief dis-
cussion of the implications of police construction of hate crime.
I. THE LEGAL TERRAIN: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
OF HATE CRIME LEGISLATION
Although there is no commonly agreed-upon definition of bias
crimes, s they generally consist of violence, threats of violence, and
harassment motivated by prejudice.16 This prejudice is based on the
actual or perceived race, religion, ethnicity or sexual orientation of
the victims. Often bias crimes are committed by a member or mem-
bers of one race, religion, ethnicity, or sexual orientation against a
member or members of another. 17 Murder, non-negligent man-
slaughter, forcible rape, aggravated and simple assault, intimidation,
arson, destruction, and damage or vandalism of property can all be
hate crimes if they manifest the requisite intent.8
15. See Valerie Jenness & Ryken Grattet, The Criminalization of Hate: A Comparison of
Structural and Polity Influences on the Passage of "Bias-Crime" Legislation in the United
States, 39 SOC. PERSP. 129, 130 (1996).
16. See, e.g., CENTER FOR DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL, WHEN HATE GROUPS COMES TO
TOWN: HANDBOOK OF EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY RESPONSES 61 (1992) (defining hate
crime).
17. Groups classifying hate crimes deal with the exceptions to this general rule
(minority groups members who commit intra-group crimes and majority groups
members who are victims) differently. For example, even though the vast majority of
anti-Semitic crimes are committed by non-Jews, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), a
group that monitors anti-Semitic violence, asserts that, barring evidence of mental
disturbance or an indication that the dispute was of a purely personal nature, bias
crimes committed by Jews against other Jews would be considered as such and in-
cluded in the Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, AUDIT OF
ANTI-SEMITIC INCIDENTS 23 (1993). Similarly, it was not until 1990 that Southern Pov-
erty Center's Klanwatch Intelligence Report included bias crimes committed against
Whites who were not Jewish; the list of hate crimes from 1980-1989 includes only
crimes committed by Whites against "minorities, Jews and gays where there is evi-
dence of bias motivation." See SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, KLANWATCH
INTELLIGENCE REPORT 47 (1989).
18. See generally FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HATE
CRIME STATISTICS (1994) (collecting hate crime statistics for murder, forcible rape,
aggravated assault, simple assault, intimidation, robbery, burglary, etc.).
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A. The Origin of Hate Crime Legislation: The Klan Act
and Federal Civil Rights Legislation
One of America's earliest attempts at proscribing racially moti-
vated violence was the Ku Klux Klan Act passed by Congress in
1871.19 Designed to combat the Ku Klux Klan's racially motivated
intimidation of Southern Blacks and voters, section 2 of the Act
made it a federal offense to:
conspire together, or go either directly or indirectly, in dis-
guise upon the public highway or upon the premises of
another for the purpose of depriving any person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges or immunities under the laws, for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any
state giving or securing to all persons within such state the
equal protection of the law.20
The penalties for violating the Klan Act ranged from fines of
$500 to $5000, imprisonment, or both, and civil liability to the in-
jured parties.2' Local resistance to Klan Act arrests and prosecutions
combined with the inadequacy of federal enforcement resources
undermined the effectiveness of the Klan Act; cases prosecuted un-
der it yielded few convictions.22 When the Justice Department was
able to obtain convictions, Southern judges often meted out penal-
ties inadequate to deter racially-motivated violence.23
After the Supreme Court nullified section 2 of the Klan Act in
United States v. Harris24 and Baldwin v. Franks,2 other parts of the Act
were incorporated into sections 51 and 52, and later, sections 241
and 242 of the Act.2' The surviving remnants of the original
19. 17 Stat. 13 (1871)
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Stephen Cresswell, Enforcing the Enforcement Acts: The Department of Justice
in Northern Mississippi, 1870-1890, 53 J. OF S. HIST. 421, 422 (1987) (describing a 28%
percent conviction rate for cases prosecuted under the Enforcement Act between
1871-1884).
23. Id. (asserting that some jurors voted to convict because they knew that judges'
penalties for Enforcement Act violations would be light); cf ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI,
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 54-55 (1989) (explaining that the Klan
"paralyzed local government agencies" as many local officials were "members of the
Klan and participated in their crimes").
24. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
25. 120 U.S. 678 (1887).
26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1996).
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legislation include both criminal and civil provisions. Section 241
prohibits two or more people from traveling in disguise on the
highway, or onto the property of another, with intent to prevent or
hinder a citizen's free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege.28 In United States v. Price,29 the Court affirmed that
Fourteenth Amendment rights were included within the compass of
section 241 and that private individuals could be prosecuted under
it.' Klan members dressed in hoods and robes, who have attempted
to deprive individuals of the free exercise of federal civil and
political rights, have been prosecuted under this provision.31 While
these provisions were used during Reconstruction to prosecute
those who interfered with exercise of the right to vote, now section
241 is generally used to prosecute those who prevent others from
using public facilities32-those who try to prevent minorities from
moving into all-White neighborhoods3 -and those who impede the
exercise of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Less explicitly tied to the terrorist actions of the Klan, sections
242, 245, and 247 protect the free and unrestricted exercise of several
different federal rights. Section 242 enforces criminal penalties
against those who, under "color of any law"---i.e. the real, pur-
ported, or claimed authority of any state or local law-deprive
individuals of federal civil rights.3 5 Enacted to prevent beatings by
local sheriffs and law enforcement officers, section 242 was used
successfully to convict two Los Angeles police officers who were
videotaped beating Rodney King.36
27. § 241.
28. Id.
29. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
30. Id.; see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (affirming constitutional-
ity of section 241 as applied to private individuals charged with criminal conspiracy to
violate Black civil rights).
31. See, e.g., Wilkins v. United States, 376 F.2d 552 (5th Cir.) (affirming conviction of
Klan members for the murder of Viola Liuzzo), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 964 (1967).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1991) (affirming convic-
tion for assault of non-White users of a public park).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 806 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1986) (affirming convic-
tion for arson of home directed at Black residents and other Black citizens who were
potential occupants of home); United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 955 (11th Cir. 1986)
(affirming conviction of Klan members for racially-motivated threats directed at
maintaining all-White neighborhoods).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Kozmininski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988) (affirming conviction
under section 241 for holding a person in involuntary servitude).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1996).
36. CENTER FOR DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL, supra note 16, at 61; see Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (affirming the use of the precursor to section 241 in police
brutality cases). Screws, the local sheriff, had a grudge against a theft suspect and
after arresting him beat him to death with his blackjack Id. at 92-93; see also Williams
v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951) (private detective with police badge acting under
SPRING 1997]
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Section 245 was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
as a response to retaliation against civil rights workers. Not solely
limited to those actions done under the color of law, section 245 al-
lows prosecution to proceed against those who, on account of a
victim's race, color, religion, or national origin, interfere "by force or
threat" with the exercise of specific federal rights, or in retaliation
• • • 37
against those who exercise protected federal rights. Among the
federal rights protected are voting,"' employment, interstate travel,
40
serving as a juror,41 receiving a benefit conferred by federal or state
government,' attending school,43 and enjoying public accommoda-
tions.44 Section 245's broad scope has been used to prosecute those
who might otherwise escape federal prosecution. For example, in
1984, supremacists David Lane and Bruce Pierce were prosecuted
under it for the murder of Jewish talk-show host Alan Berg who
45
made a practice of ridiculing hate groups on the air.
Other sections of federal law used less frequently to prosecute
hate crime are provisions that prohibit: 1) the willful interference
with civil rights under the Fair Housing Act;46 2) the intentional in-
terference by force or threat with the free exercise of religion;47 and
3) the intentional defacement or attempted defacement, damage, or
destruction of religious buildings or grounds. 8
In 1994, Congress added penalty enhancements for hate crimes
to the existing federal legislation. As part of the Violent Crime and
Control Law Enforcement Act of 1994,49 Congress passed provisions
requiring the United States Sentencing Commission to create sen-
tencing guidelines that enhance penalties for individuals convicted
of hate crimes under federal civil rights law. The new guidelines are
"color of law"); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (upholding indictments
under sections 241 and 242 for individuals involved in the killing of civil rights).




41. §§ 245(b)(1)(D), 245(b)(2)(D).
42. §§ 245(b)(1)(C), 245(b)(2)(B).
43. § 245(b)(2)(A).
44. § 245(b)(2)(F).
45. See United States v. Lane, 883 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1059 (1990). The prosecutor in Lane argued that Berg's murder was motivated by his
religion and his on-air comments and, therefore, interfered with his enjoyment of his
employment as a radio talk-show host. Id. at 1496.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a) (1994) (prohibiting interference, intimidation and attempts
to injure because of race, color, sex, or religion those who are or are attempting to sell,
rent, or purchase dwellings).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 247(a)(2) (1996).
48. § 247(a)(1).




"Victim Related Adjustments" that allow the sentencing judge to
increase a defendant's sentence in cases involving "hate crime moti-
vation '" and "vulnerable victim."51 Though the vulnerable victim
(subsection (b)) and hate crime motivation (subsection (a)) adjust-
ments are to be applied cumulatively, subsection (b) may not be
applied in a case when the hate crime motivation adjustment also
applies, unless the victim of the offense was unusually vulnerable
for reasons unrelated to race, color, national origin, ethnicity, gen-
der, disability, or sexual orientation. 2
While federal laws have been used effectively in some cases,
groups that monitor hate crimes insist that political considerations
and the limited scope of federal hate crime law s3 severely restricts
the number of situations in which they can be used. For example,
under Republican administrations, the Justice Department has been
reluctant to become involved in issues traditionally associated with
minorities, civil rights, and governmental interference; thus, the use
of federal hate crime legislation has waned s4
B. State Hate Crime Statutes
Perhaps as a result of the paucity of federal remedies or due to
the fact that states generally have jurisdiction over criminal matters,
the vast majority of bias crimes are prosecuted at the state level 55
Almost all states have some type of hate crime legislation; either
laws specifically enacted to combat hate crimes or additions to the
50. U.S.S.G. § 3A.1.l(a) (1996). This section provides:
If the finder of fact at trial or, in the case of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere,
the court at sentencing determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant intentionally selected any victim or any property as the object of the
offense because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion or national ori-
gin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation or any person, increase
by 3 levels.
Id.
51. § 3A.1.1(b). This section provides: "If the defendant knew or should have know
that a victim of the offense was unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental
condition, or that a victim was otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal con-
duct, increase by 2 levels." Id.
52. § 3A.1.1, comment, n.3.
53. These provisions generally only protect the exercise of rights guaranteed by
federal law.
54. See JACK L. LEVIN & JACK MCDEVITT, HATE CRIMES: THE RISING TIDE OF
BIGOTRY AND BLOODSHED 182 (1993). Levin and McDevitt stated that, according to the
Southern Poverty Law Center, between 1987 and 1989, the Bush Administration
Justice Department prosecuted only 31 federal cases of racial violence, most of which
involved housing discrimination. Id.
55. Id. at 186.
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existing criminal and/or civil code.s6 Many states have penalty en-
hancement statutes that increase punishment for crimes motivated
by biass' and statutes that prohibit threats, intimidation, and physi-
cal violence." States have used anti-mask statutes, cross-burning
statutes, and institutional vandalism statutes to prohibit interference
with the free exercise of civil rights or prohibit action historically
associated with racial violence. A number of states have civil
remedies that allow victims to sue for damages as well as injunctive
relief regardless of whether the incident in question leads to a prose-
cution or not.60 Some states also mandate sensitivity training for law
enforcement officers, 6' hate crime data collection, 62 and education of
perpetrators and the public63
1. Anti-Mask, Institutional Vandalism,
and Cross-Burning Statutes
One of the oldest forms of prohibition against bias-motivated
violence at the state level, anti-mask statutes, federal legislation
aimed at the Ku Klux Klan, generally penalize the wearing of a
mask, hood, or disguise while in public or on the private property of
another without permission.6 Most anti-mask legislation was en-
acted in response to the terror caused by the hooded costumes worn
by Ku Klux Klan and was passed in the 1920s or the 1950s, during
56. LU-IN WANG, HATE CRIMES LAW 9-2 (1996) (hate crimes treatise providing an
overview of hate crime legislation on state and federal level). Wang indicated that
only Wyoming had no legislation specially relating to bias crime. See id. at App. B.
57. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(22) (Michie 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.75
(West 1996); 730 ILL. COM. STAT. § 5/5-5-3.2(a)(10) (West 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15A-1340.16(d)(17) (1996).
58. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11413(b)(9) (West 1996); MD. ANN. CODE OF 1957 ART.
27, § 470A(b)(3), (4); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 39 (1996).
59. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 406 S.E.2d 398, 401 (Va. App. 1991)
(asserting "legislature's original motivation for enacting the anti-mask statute may
have been to 'unmask the Klan' "); State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d. 547, 550 (Ga. 1990)
(maintaining the "statute was passed in response to need to safeguard the people of
Georgia from terrorization by masked vigilantes").
60. See 720 ILL. COM. STAT. § 5/21-1.2(a) (West 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:2799.2 (West 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 127A (1996); MO. ANN STAT. §
527.523 (West 1996).
61. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 35-3-60 through 35-3-65.
62. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1750.A.3 (West 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 13023
(West 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-7m (West 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4002
(1996).
63. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.95(b) (West 1996).
64. Generally statutes have exemptions for innocent activities such as wearing a
mask as part of a holiday costume, for a masquerade ball, or for medical or safety
reasons. WANG, supra note 56, at 11-5, § 11.02.
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peak periods of Klan activity 65 As of December 1996, seventeen
states have anti-mask statutes."
Institutional vandalism statutes, the most common type of state
hate crime statute, prohibit vandalism and defacement of a variety
of locations, including public monuments and institutions.
Currently, thirty-six states have statutes prohibiting institutional
vandalism.67 Some were enacted during the 1960s in response to Ku
Klux Klan harassment of Black political institutions and churches."
Subsequently-enacted statutes also prohibit the defacement of
Jewish temples, community centers, and grave sites. Some state
statutes are be based on the model legislation created by the Anti-
Defamation League (ADL).
The burning of a cross, which originated as a signal from the
Ku Klux Klan that a Black person was about to be murdered, is
prohibited by law in twenty-one states.69 Cross burning may be
prohibited under several different types of statutes. It may also be
prohibited by statutes that punish the action without requiring
prosecutors to prove a specific level of intent. Other statutes forbid
cross burning only if an individual intends to intimidate or interfere
with the exercise of another's civil rights. Cross burning may also be
prohibited under statutes that bar terrorist threats. Lastly, state stat-
70
utes penalize cross burning under ethnic intimidation statutes.
2. Bias-Motivated Violence and Intimidation Statutes
Thirty-five states have bias-motivated violence and
intimidation statutes. 7' These statutes include one or more of the
following elements: (1) criminalization of ethnic intimidation; (2)
automatic enhancement of penalties for crimes motivated by
forbidden prejudices; or (3) authorization of judicial discretion to
increase penalties when the crime was motivated by a forbidden
65. Id. at § 11.01.
66. Id. at App. B. (delineating state anti-mask statutes); see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:313. (West 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 750.217, 750.396 (West 1996); MINN.
STAT. § 609.735 (1996).
67. WANG, supra note 56, at App. B-1 (delineating state institutional vandalism
statutes); see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.36.080(2)(b), 961.160-.180 (West 1996)
("[Tlhreats to bomb or injure property[.]"); WIS. STAT. § 943.012 (1996) (criminalizing
the vandalization of religious or other public institutional structures).
68. WANG, supra note 56, at § 11.01.
69. Id. at App. B (delineating state cross burning statutes). Most states also prohibit
the burning of any other religious symbol. See id.
70. Id. at § 12.02; see infra Part l.A.b.
71. Id. at App. B. (delineating state bias-motivated violence and intimidation stat-
utes); see WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9A.36.080 (West 1996).
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prejudice. Some states, including Oregon," Michigan,73 and New
York,74 have based their statutes on a model created by the Anti-
Defamation League. The four-part ADL model statute, created in
1981 to combat all types of hate crimes, has sections on institutional
vandalism, intimidation, civil action for institutional vandalism and
intimidation, and bias crime reporting and training for law
enforcement personnel.75 Bias-motivated violence and intimidation
statutes generally have categories of "protected persons" or
"protected status" that may not serve as the motivational element of
the crime. Most statutes bar threats, harassment, assaults, and
trespassing on account of a person's race, color, religion, or national
origin. In addition, fourteen states include sexual orientation in the
list of bias motivations; eleven states include gender. As of
December 1996, eight states also had special punishments for crimes
motivated by disability;76 Iowa 77 included political affiliation and
78 79 40Iowa, Minnesota, Vermont, and Washington, D.C."' alsoincluded age.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS
CREATED BY BIAS CRIME LEGISLATION
Despite the proliferation of hate crime legislation, bias crime
statutes are a controversial means of combating racial violence. In
72. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 166.155, 166.165 (1996).
73. MICH. COMP. LAWSANN. § 750.147b (West 1996).
74. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 240.30, 240.31 (McKinney 1996).
75. The ADL's model Bias-Motivated Intimidation provision reads:
2. Intimidation
A. A person commits the crime of intimidation if, by reason of the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation of another
individual or group of individuals, he violates Section __ of the Penal Code
[insert code provision for criminal trespass, criminal mischief, harassment,
menacing, assault and/or any other appropriate statutorily proscribed crimi-
nal conduct].
B. Intimidation is a __ misdemeanor/felony [the degree of criminal liability
should be at least one degree more serious than that imposed for the commis-
sion of the offense].
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 17, at 3.
76. WANG, supra note 56, at App. B (delineating intimidation statutes which pro-
scribe disability as motivation).
77. IOWACODE §§ 729.5, 729A.2 (1996).
78. Id.
79. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2231 (West 1996).
80. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1454-55 (1995).
81. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4001, -4003 (West 1996).
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courts of law and both inside and outside the circles of legal aca-
deme, laws that punish cross burning or that provide penalty
enhancement for hate crimes have been hotly debated.82 Critics of
hate crime laws say they are unconstitutional,83 while supporters
insist they go to an examination of the offender's motive, something
often a factor in criminal law."
Perhaps bias crime legislation is so controversial because bias
crimes place many between a theoretical rock and hard place. On the
one hand, the random senselessness of bias-motivated violence
horrifies many Americans. Particularly vicious bias crimes, such as
the widely publicized setting afire of a Black tourist by White
supremacists in 1993,85 raise the specter of the Holocaust and Ku
Klux Klan night rides that still linger in our national consciousness.
On the other hand, however, many Americans feel that punishment
of people for their beliefs, even if these beliefs constitute hatred, flies
in the face of the ethic of toleration on which this country was
founded. Some may draw the line where belief leads to action. The
proper reply to this argument is that the founders of this country
fought for the freedom to believe what one wants and the freedom
to act on it, and this is what the Supreme Court has supported in a
86number of free speech cases in the last twenty years.
Political objections to hate crime legislation, especially penalty
enhancement laws, suggest that such laws violate American socio-
political and legal norms. The socio-political critique often relies on
the "sacredness" of American values like democracy or the great
American tradition of political protest."7 Typically, those who con-
demn hate crime legislation purport that condemning prejudice by
having special penalties for even the most violent expression of
"ideas" silences both bigots and dissidents. 8 Political "pluralism"
82. See generally Symposium: Demise of the First Amendment? Focus on Rico and Hate
Crime Legislation-Shield from Terrorism? or National Gag Order?, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
831 (1995) (debating the constitutionality of hate crime legislation); Symposium: Penalty
Enhancement for Hate Crimes, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1992 (discussing the
benefits and disadvantages of creating hate crime legislation).
83. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
84. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
85. See Hatred Turns Out Not To Be Color-Blind, TIME, Jan. 18, 1993, at 22.
86. Examples of cases in which the Court has prohibited the unbridled government
regulation of politically or socially unpopular ideas without compelling reasons in-
clude Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning case); Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (civil rights case); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641
(1984) (bringing suit against Time for reproducing U.S. currency on its cover).
87. See Jonathan Rauch, In Defense of Prejudice: Why Incendiary Speech Must be Pro-
tected, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, May 1995, at 37.
88. Id.; see also Susan Gellman, Hate Crimes After Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 21 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 863, 868 (1995) ("[Tlhe overarching, unifying theme of the Bill of Rights,
especially the First Amendment, is the particular protection of dissent and non-
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mandates that all ideas be heard.8 9 It is only through free and open
debate that bigotry withers, somewhat akin to short-necked giraffes
succumbing to the process of natural selection."
Critics of this political pluralism model to ending racism
through free and open debate in the "marketplace of ideas" raise the
point that bigoted ideas often have more influence than other views.
Charles Lawrence III, who is tolerant of laws restricting racist
speech, argues that the experience of Black Americans and other
people of color has shown not only the tenacity of racism in the
ideological free market, but also that "the idea of racial inferiority of
non-whites infects, skews, and disables the... market... ,9' Accord-
ing to Lawrence, racism is imbedded in culture to such an extent
that we often do not recognize it.92 Because of a menacing legacy of
threats and violence, racist words and actions silence people of
color. Thus, Lawrence argues, racism by its very nature does not al-
low the normal social intercourse necessary for the free exchange of
ideas.93
Those who object to bias-motivated violence and intimidation
statutes for constitutional reasons generally emphasize the eviden-
tiary problem posed by the use of racist or other bias speech uttered
by the defendant during the commission of the crime as evidence of
bias motivation. Many of these critics premise their objection on the
purported difficulty of disentangling criminal action from protected
expression of speech94 or thought.9 Susan Gellman, a staunch critic
conformity. That is why seemingly tenuously related concerns of religion, speech,
press, assembly, and petition for redress do belong grouped together in the First
Amendment. They all protect the one who disagrees, who is different, or who offends
the majority, from the power of the majority and the state.").
89. See Barbara Dority, The Criminalization of Hatred, HUMANIST, MAY 1994, at 39
(criticizes hate crime laws on ground that "the cure for hatred ... cannot be found
through the police powers of the state... [but] lies in mind of a free people who sup-
press, without the aid of government, the liberty to reject it").
90. See Rauch, supra note 87, at 43. Rauch argues that since regulations permitting
free speech protects bigots and dissidents alike, minorities have as much, if not more,
to gain from free speech laws. Id. at 45. Not only are hate speech and hate crime legis-
lation used against minorities disproportionately, such measures also send prejudice
underground rather than eradicate it. Id. at 39. "Intellectual pluralism," Rauch con-
tends, focuses not on "purists"' unrealistic vision of stamping out prejudice, but
rather allows prejudice to be "managed." Id. at 38-42.
91. Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, in WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 53, 77 (Mari J. Matsuda, et al. eds., 1993).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 79.
94. There is general agreement that racist speech deserves protection. However, a
significant minority of scholars argue that the First Amendment should but does not
protect racist speech. See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering
the Victim's Story in WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 91, at 17-51. Matsuda, like other
critical race theorists, insists that truly racist speech can concretely be identified and
separated from political speech. She defines racist speech as persecutory, hateful, and
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of bias crime legislation, levels most of her criticism at the ADL
model statute for bias-motivated intimidation. Gellman insists stat-
utes based on the ADL model are so vague that it is nearly
impossible to separate bias crimes from those not motivated by
bias,96 an infirmity which she insists violates the rule of Grayned v.
City of Rockford,' in which the Supreme Court decided that such
vagueness offends due process.98 Evidentiary problems posed by
what she believes to be the arbitrariness of racial epithets and the
possibility of "multiple meanings" for a variety of racial slurs simi-
larly disturb Gellman.99 Other proof problems in the identification of
bias motivation include the model statute's failure to specify a cul-
pable mental state of the offender and vagueness in situations where
motives are mixed."'
For First Amendment absolutists like Gellman who criticize
bias crime laws, the main problem with classifying some crimes as
bias-motivated and others as not bias-motivated is the legal system's
inability to determine from an individual's words whether bias mo-
tivated the incident in question or whether the racist or other biased
utterances stemmed from the individual's deeply held, politically
unpopular, "biased" ideas, which provided no motivation for the
pressed group. Id. at 36. Matsuda implies that the argument which insists that racist
speech is indistinguishable from political expression is something of smoke screen.
She alleges moreover that protecting free speech is a public choice that symbolizes the
value that is placed on people of color in the society. "The places where the law does
not go to redress harm have tended to be the place where women people of color and
poor people live." Id. at 18. Sanctioning racial bias makes the statement that the vic-
tims of racist speech are valued members of our society. Id.
95. See Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, but Can Words Increase
Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 333, 349 (1991); see also James Morsch, Comment, The Problem of Motive in Hate
Crimes: The Argument Against Presumptions of Racial Motivations, 82 J. OF CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 659, 671 (1991) (arguing prosecutors are prohibited by the First
Amendment from using the accused's beliefs because liberal admission may chill
freedom of expression).
96. Gellman, supra note 95, at 356. Attempting to complicate the process for identi-
fying bias-motivated incidents, Gellman suggests atypical examples which will fall
within the ambit of the bias crime statutes, even though the alleged perpetrators had
benign motives. In her "hard case," involving a "racial champion," White woman A
who, hearing another White woman B, calling C, an African American child, a racist
name, threatens B in an attempt to protect C. Id. at 356-57. Evidently, Gellman feels
that in practice there will be ambiguous cases similar to this one which the model
statute should theoretically protect, but which would probably end up falling through
the cracks.
97. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
98. Gellman, supra note 95, at 355; see also Phyliss B. Gerstenfeld, Smile When You
Call Me That!: The Problems with Punishing Hate Motivated Behavior, 10 BEHAV. SC. & L.
259, 274-76 (1992) (describing challenges made by defendants in Oregon, Minnesota,
and Ohio to hate crimes statutes for vagueness and overbreadth).
99. Gellman, supra note 95, at 355-56.
100. Id. at 356-57.
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crime.10' When the speaker's words are used as evidence of an ele-
ment of the offense, these writers argue that the illegal conduct
being punished consists solely of the actor's bigoted sentiments,
something they consider not only to violate the First Amendment
but also to chill the expression of "biased" ideas. Using a slippery
slope analysis, First Amendment absolutists see bias crimes as
leading to "thought crimes.'0 3
Those who maintain that bias crime legislation is constitutional
generally do so on two slightly contradictory grounds; the first is
that most bias crime laws do not implicate the First Amendment,'O
and the second is that even if bias crime legislation does regulate
expressive conduct, it does so permissibly.'05 The first argument, that
bias crime statutes do not implicate the First Amendment, highlights
what their defenders consider bias crime statutes to prohibit. Bias
crime statutes, these writers maintain, prohibit hate violence which
they emphatically declare is not speech.'0 In the wake of R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul,'07 in which the Supreme Court invalidated a city hate
crime ordinance, many are quick to acknowledge some
constitutional limitations on state regulation of bias-motivated
conduct, but they distinguish hate violence from cross burning
which they view as inherently a form of political expression.0 8 Hate
101. Id. at 359; see Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Thought as Freedom of Expression:
Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement and First Amendment Theory, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS,
Summer/Fall 1992, at 30.
102. Gellman, supra note 95, at 359-61.
103. Id. at 382.
104. Cf. Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox:
Punishing Bias Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 675, 711
(1993) (arguing that "[rlacially-targeted behavior that vents the actor's racism . . . is
racial speech that is protected by the First Amendment").
105. Shirley S. Abrahamson et al., Words and Sentences: Penalty Enhancement for Hate
Crimes, 16 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 515, 526-27 (1994) (arguing that Wisconsin's
penalty enhancement statute punishes acts, not beliefs, and that the "statute does
nothing more than assign consequences to invidiously discriminatory acts") (emphasis
in original); see also Richard Cordray, Free Speech and the Thought We Hate, 21 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 871, 873 (1995) (distinguishing hate crimes from that hate speech laws on
the grounds the hate crimes laws that target the actual "act" of intentional selection at
the root of hate crimes).
106. See James Weinstein, First Amendment Challenges to Hate Crime Legislation:
Where's the Speech?, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1992, at 7; see also Abramson,
supra note 105, at 527 ("[Tlhe only chilling effect [of Wisconsin's penalty enhancement
statute] is on lawless conduct.") (emphasis in original); Lawrence, supra note 104, at
696 ("Enhancing a criminal sentence for any 'hate crime' . . . in no way creates a
"thought crime" or penalizes anyone's conduct based on a non-proscribable viewpoint
or message that such conduct contains or expresses.").
107. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
108. Weinstein, supra note 106, at 12; see Jonathan David Selbin, Bashers Beware: The
Continuing Constitutionality of Hate Crime Statutes After R.A.V., 72 OR. L. REV. 157, 168
(1993).
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violence, they argue, is conduct that compares with prostitution,'09
but contrasts with conduct such as wearing a jacket that says "fuck
the draft"'10 or burning a flag."' Many argue that placing hate-
motivated violence with prostitution is appropriate because, unlike
the latter two actions, hate violence is not commonly undertaken to
communicate any ,tpe of message; "it is more assault than a
political statement.
Those who find many hate crime statutes constitutional also
roundly criticize Gelman and other scholars who equate hate
crimes statutes' enhanced penalties with the punishment of racist or
unpopular thoughts and beliefs. In their critique they point to the
widespread use of motive in the criminal law"13 as an aggravating
factor in death penalty cases. Looking to the civil context, proof of
motive is also crucial in anti-discrimination law."5 Critics often insist
109. The Supreme Court has not extended First Amendment protection to prostitu-
tion. See Acara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 702 (1986) (declaring prostitution
occurring in N.Y. book store closed by state officials manifests absolutely no element
of protected expression).
110. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) (ruling that jacket with "fuck the
draft" did not constitute "fighting words" and defendant could not be prevented from
exercising his First Amendment right to wear it).
111. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (declaring flag burning as a protected
form of expression under the First Amendment).
112. Selbin, supra note 108, at 169.
113. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Bias Crimes: What Do Haters Deserve?, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS,
Summer/Fall 1992, at 20-22. Murphy also supplies a normative reason that motive is
used as an aggravating factor in criminal law. He maintains that criminal law would
more than likely lose society's respect if it did not at least in some ways track "our
moral intuitions about desert." Id. at 21 (using Justice Holmes' analogy that even a dog
recognizes and cares about the difference between being kicked on purpose and being
tripped over accidentally). For human beings who are complex social beings who
deeply rely on symbolic communication, there is a great impetus to punish hate
crimes as vehicles for the transmission of degrading and humiliating messages. Id. at
22-23; see also Selbin, supra note 108, at 177 (arguing that "[hiate crimes are qualita-
tively different events than ordinary criminal acts ..." and "hate violence infects
human communities in a dramatic fashion and threatens their very survival"); Wein-
stein, supra note 106, at 8 (explaining that a retributivist views racial violence as
"inherently more reprehensible because of the racial motivation" and a legal moralist
finds that "society regards racial violence as especially reprehensible").
114. See Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992) (finding that the introduction of
the defendant's membership in a racist organization during sentencing was not con-
trary to his First Amendment rights); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (holding
that the trial judge's comparison of Barclay's act to the judge's personal experience
with Nazi concentration camps in World War II was valid in sentencing determina-
tions). Murder for profit is another example. See Lawrence, supra note 104, at 717;
Weinstein, supra note 106, at 8.
115. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)
(holding that even if plaintiff proves defendant's articulated reason was pretext, de-
fendant may still be required to prove intent to discriminate); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (holding that plaintiff bears burden for proving
employer's articulated reason was pretextual).
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that scholars like Gellman place too much emphasis on the distinc-
tion between motive and intent.11 6 While intent concerns the mental
state provided in the definition of an offense in order to asses the
actor's culpability with respect to the element of the offense, and
motive concerns the cause that drives an actor to his purpose, the
distinction between the two is a fine one and the decision as to what
constitutes each will vary depending on the act being criminalized.
117
Frederick Lawrence insists that a better way of thinking about
motive that dramatizes the distinction between hate crime and hate
speech is to view motive in bias crime cases as part of a two-tier
system."' Under this system, Lawrence argues that prosecutors must
prove two essentially unrelated mens rea elements: the first applica-
ble to the parallel crime, i.e. the intent to commit assault; and the
second, demonstrating that the accused was motivated by bias in the
commission of the parallel crime. Therefore, racist speech, which
lacks the recklessness, knowledge, or purpose to commit a parallel
crime, cannot be prosecuted under bias crime laws."9
In U.S. v. 0 'Brien,"' the Court devised an approach to evaluate
whether statutes permissibly regulate expressive conduct. There, the
Court found that even if a court determines bias-motivated conduct
contains elements of expressive speech implicating the First
Amendment, such conduct does not necessarily merit First
Amendment protection.'2'1 O'Brien required the regulation: 1) be
within the constitutional power of the government; 2) further an
important or substantial government interest; 3) be unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and 4) have incidental restrictions on
the alleged First Amendment freedoms that are no greater than what
is essential to further the state interest.122 Defenders of hate crime
laws argue that under the state's delegated power to pass laws
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens, state
legislatures may clearly criminalize violent conduct.123 To satisfy the
second prong of the test, defenders of the laws insist the
government's compelling interest in suppressing hate crime is
116. Murphy, supra note 113, at 21.
117. Lawrence, supra note 104, at 720-21.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 699.
120. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
121. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (holding that, in actions combining speech and non-
speech elements, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-
speech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedom).
O'Brien had been convicted for burning his draft card on the steps of a federal court-
house in violation of an amendment to the Selective Service Act which prohibited
draft card mutilation. Id. at 369.
122. Id. at 377.
123. Selbin, supra note 108, at 176.
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justified by the intense danger to the communities they pose.124
Finally, many in this camp argue that the third and forth prongs of
the test are satisfied since the laws are aimed at hate-motivated
violence, not the expression of hatred, so states' interest in
promoting expression is unrelated to the suppression of expression,
and ample opportunities2 s exist for people to express their hatred.2 6
A. United States Supreme Court
Over the past four years, the Supreme Court has shifted back
and forth the boundaries within which states may regulate bias-
motivated hatred. In a landmark bias crime statute case handed
down in 1992, RKA.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court demanded the
even-handed treatment of all crimes regardless of bias 27 and, in
doing so, supported the idea that actual hate crimes are difficult to
identify because they are so closely linked to politically protected
speech. The case concerned the conviction of Robert Viktora who
was prosecuted under the St. Paul Bias Motive Crime Ordinance128
for burning a cross on the front lawn of a Black family. Relying on
the Court's decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,"2 the plaintiffs
in R.A.V. argued that cross burning was a form of "fighting
words."' O3 In interpreting the ordinance, the Minnesota Supreme
Court had declared the ordinance to reach only the expressions of
124. Id. at 177, 180 n.79 (citing National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence
data showing: 1) hate crimes more often occur as serial incidents; 2) hate crime vic-
tims are more traumatically effected; and 3) hate violence causes parallel psycho-
physiological and behavioral damage to the victim's community as well); Weinstein,
supra note 106, at 9 (listing credible reasons for increased penalties for perpetrators of
bias-motivated violence: 1) legal, moral, and retributivist justification for heightened
reprehensibility of racial violence; 2) racial violence hurts victims and their commu-
nity more than other types of violence; and 3) racial violence has ramifications for
society as a whole).
125. Selbin, supra note 108, at 181 (arguing that bias crimes statutes do not prohibit
expression of hatred).
126. Id.
127. 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992).
128. ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990). It provided:
Who ever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion,
or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
129. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Chaplinsky defined "fighting words to mean words which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace." Id. at 572.
130. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at381.
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fighting words within the meaning of Chaplinsky."' Reversing the
state high court, the Supreme Court extended constitutional
protection to cross burning, arguing that by not criminalizing all so-
called fighting words, the Minnesota statute was clearly attempting
to isolate certain words based on their political content.32 Calling
such treatment "viewpoint discrimination,'3 3 Justice Scalia insisted
that "St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow the Marquis of
Queensberry rules."134 The Court rejected the city's desire to
communicate to the minority population its condemnation of the
message in bias-motivated speech as insufficient to justify a content
based ordinance.1" Although the Court found St. Paul's interests
compelling, it deemed the ordinance not reasonably necessary,
maintaining that "[a]n ordinance not limited to the favored
topics.. .would have had the same beneficial effect.
1 36
Less than one year later, apparently in light of much confusion
in the state high courts on the constitutionality of penalty
enhancement statutes similar to Wisconsin's, 37 the Court elected to
rule on another bias crime case, Wisconsin v. Mitchell,38 a case in
which, ironically, a Black man was the defendant.'39 In this case,
after viewing the movie Mississippi Burning, Todd Mitchell, a Black
man urged a group to attack a 14 year-old White youth.'40 Mitchell
was convicted under the Wisconsin hate crime statute 4 1 and his
two-year sentence was doubled. The Wisconsin law, based on the
ADL model statute, provided that the penalty for crimes against
people or property be increased if the victim or object has been
intentionally selected "in whole or in part because of the actor's
belief or perception regarding the [victim's] race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry.. .whether
131. See Matter of Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510-11 (Minn. 1991).
132. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 392.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 396.
137. For evidence of the confusion, see, e.g., State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or.
1992) (upholding Oregon statute); State v. Wynant, 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio App. 1992)
(striking down Ohio Statue); State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W 2d 807 (Wis. 1992) (striking
down Wisconsin statute), rev 'd Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
138. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
139. According to the FBI, the majority (approximately 57% in 1994) of hate crimes
are committed by White persons. Critics of hate crime legislation use the fact that a
Black man is the defendant to argue that these laws will be used in differential prose-
cution. See Gellman, supra note 95, at 387.
140. 508 U.S. at 479-80.
141. WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (1996).
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or not the actor's belief or perception was correct. 14  Mitchell
challenged his conviction on First Amendment grounds arguing that
the Wisconsin statute was overly broad. He alleged that providing
for enhanced penalties whenever a defendant intentionally selects
victims on the basis of race violates defendants' free speech rights.
When the case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Court relied on Barclay v. Florida"" for the proposition that judges
may consider racial motivation in sentencing. In doing so, the
Court upheld the view popular among hate crime law supporters by
avowing that the defendant's motive for committing a bias crime
can be identified and separated from issues of constitutionally pro-
tected political expression. The Court's ruling in Mitchell affirmed
that punishing a criminal because of his selection of the victim based
on bias or other hatred does not violate a defendant's free speech
rights. The ruling also gave broad support for two important ideas:
1) that violence is neither speech nor expressive conduct protected
by the First Anendment;146 and 2) the State of Wisconsin's desire to
prohibit bias-motivated conduct does serve as an adequate explana-
tion justifying limits on one particular type of speech (i.e., racist,
anti-religious, anti-gay, lesbian and bisexual) over others. 7
B. Policing Free Speech or Enforcing Bias Crime Legislation?
Though the constitutional sanction offered by the courts for
laws like Wisconsin's appears to have settled the constitutional de-
bate on the validity of hate crime legislation, for those charged with
the initial identification and classification of the crimes, declaring
the laws to be on sound constitutional grounds solves some148 but
not all problems. Hate crimes remain difficult to enforce for several
reasons. Because motivation is an element of the crime and most
hate crime statutes contain no definition of what constitutes evi-
dence of bias-motivation, hate crimes are difficult to prosecute. Bias
142. Id.
143. 508 U.S. at 481.
144. 463 U.S. 939 (1983). The defendant and others in Barclay were attempting to
start a race war through the indiscriminate murder of White people. Id. at 942. The
sentencing judge kept the racial motivation under consideration as an aggravating
factor in determining whether to impose the death penalty. Id. at 948.
145. 508 U.S. at 486.
146. Id. at 484.
147. Id. at 488.
148. There is some evidence that the police pay attention to the Supreme Court's
judgment of the constitutionality of bias crime laws. See, e.g., Katia Hetter, Enforcers of
Hate-Crime Laws Wary After High Court Ruling, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1992, at B1
(describing law enforcement officials as wary about enforcing hate crime laws after
Supreme Court's decision in R1A. V. v. City of St. Paul).
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motivation, according to the constitutional literature, is a compli-
cated matter about which the police receive no statutory guidance. 49
In New York, for example, the legal motivation for police identifica-
tion and classification of bias crimes comes from just two sections of
the Penal Law that criminalize bias crime. 50 The statutes criminalize
actions entered into because of race, color, religion, or national ori-
gin 51 but supply no procedure for identifying motivation or criteria
for acceptable evidence of motivation.
The lack of procedures and criteria for the legal evidence of bias
motivation would not be a problem were it not so difficult to iden-
tify bias motivation. There is at least one serious problem associated
149. James B. Jacobs, Rethinking the War Against Hate Crimes: A New York City Per-
spective, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1992, at 55, 56 (describing motivation as
complicated and at minimum encompassing ideas about unconscious as well as con-
scious desires).
150. For aggravated harassment in the second degree, the statute provides:
A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when,
with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, he or she:
1. Communicates, or causes a communication to be initiated by
mechanical or electronic means or otherwise, with a person anonymously or
otherwise, by telephone, or by telegraph, mail or any other form of written
communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; or
2. Makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues,
with no purpose of legitimate communication; or
3. Strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects another person to
physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same because of the race,
color, religion, national origin of such person.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (McKinney, 1996). For aggravated harassment in the first
degree, the statute provides:
A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the first degree when
with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, because of the
race, color, religion, or national origin of such a person he:
1. Damages premises primarily used for religious purposes, or ac-
quired pursuant to section six of the religious corporation law and maintained
for the purposes of religious instruction, and the damages to the premises ex-
ceeds fifty dollars; or
2. Commits the crime of aggravated harassment in the 2nd degree
in the manner proscribed by the provisions of subdivision three of section
240.30 of this article and has been previously convicted of the crime of aggra-
vated harassment in the second degree.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.31 (McKinney, 1996).
151. Sexual orientation and disability are two categories that the police in New
York classify as hate crime despite their absence from the Penal Law. NEW YORK CITY
POLICE DEP'T, Background Information on the Bias Incident Investigation Unit, at 1
(unpublished document on file with the author).
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with identifying bias motivation, similar to one identified in the
constitutional literature-the difficulty of separating bias crimes
from protected speech. In New York, the need for police officers to
be wary of free speech when identifying and classifying was drama-
tized in a 1990 Departmental legal bulletin that discussed People v.
Dietze, s52 a case in which the New York Court of Appeals reversed a
lower court conviction and struck down a section of the penal law
on the grounds that it criminalized free speech. Jackie Dietze was
convicted of calling a woman she knew to be mentally disabled "a
bitch," her son a "dog," and for threatening to "beat the crap out of"
the woman "some day or night in the street."'' 3 The Court of Appeals
overturned Dietze's conviction under subdivision 2 of the Penal
Law § 240.25, which prohibited the use of obscene language or ges-
tures in public with an intent to harass, annoy, or alarm, and struck
down the statute as unconstitutionally vague.15 The court said that
on the facts there was no evidence that Dietze's shouts were a seri-
ous threat, and declared that unaccompanied by an act, the slurs did
not constitute anything more than a "crude outburst.' ' sl In a memo
to patrol officers, the Police Department attempted to reconcile the
ruling in Dietze with New York law still on the books by holding
that such outbursts made again and again would violate the city's
hate crime law.56
While there may be no inherent difficulty in identifying bias
crimes, as free speech absolutists suggest, separating bias crimes
from free speech may at the very least require police officers to make
extremely fine legal distinctions, a job that may require a clear un-
derstanding of the vagaries of First Amendment jurisprudence. In
addition, police officers' jobs are often complicated by the lack of
public understanding about what bias crime laws prohibit.'57 In Edi-
son, New Jersey, Police Chief Edward Costello complained about
people who wanted the police to make arrests when a group of anti-
Semites began leafleting the City. He protested:
[T]he Constitution is a very powerful document and it
grants people rights, very broad rights, in the area of the
First Amendment. It is the leafleting that has been the
problem. They have a right to express their views, as un-
152. 549 N.E.2d 1166 (N.Y. 1989).
153. Id. at 1167.
154. Id. at 1169.
155. Id. at 1170.
156. NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEP'T, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER-LEGAL
MATTERS, Legal Bureau Bulletin, Feb. 16, 1990, at 3 (unpublished document on file
with author).
157. See Linda Bean, Prosecuting Bias Cases: A Delicate Balancing Act, N.J. L.J., Sept.
27, 1993, at 4.
SPRING 1997]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
pleasant as those view may be. It is an emotional issue
more than an intellectual issue, but the criminal law is
limited in what it can do. We can punish conduct, but we
can't punish speech.'*"
This assumes that the distinction between hate crimes and hate
speech is as simple as the mere difference between speech and con-
duct. However, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire'"9and United States v.
O'Brien 16 suggest that expressive conduct may also have First
Amendment protection.
Police officers' task may be further complicated because all bias
crimes do not share the same type of motivation. Experts who study
hate crime perpetrators have identified four different types of hate
crimes: those motivated by resentment, those done for the thrill of it,
reactive have crimes, and mission hate crimes.16' Hate crimes moti-
vated by resentment are increasing in popularity as downward
mobility in the 1980s led many bigots to look for someone on which
to blame for their misfortune. 62 Those who commit hate crimes "for
the thrill of it" perform utterly random attacks for the enjoyment and
exhilaration of making individuals suffer.'" "Reactive" hate crimes
are motivated by the personal threat posed by outsiders' entrance
into a previously homogenous area. T' Finally, the rarest type of hate
crime, "mission" hate crimes, often perpetrated by members of or-
ganized hate groups, are characterized by a desire to rid the world of
all members of a particular group.1' In the perpetrator's mind,
members of the targeted group are subhuman and must be elimi-
nated to prevent them from destroying the perpetrator's culture,
• • • 166
economy or purity of racial heritage. Levin and McDevitt argue
that Jews, gays and lesbians, and racial and ethnic minorities are
often the victims of these crimes because the culture of hate preva-
lent in society tells perpetrators these groups are acceptable to blame
for one's problems and are socially acceptable to victimize.
167
Levin and McDevitt maintain that law enforcement officers
must learn that a successful investigation will depend on the type of
hate crime committed.' 68 For example, a hate crime motivated by
158. Id.
159. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
160. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
161. See Levin & McDevitt, supra note 54, at 49, 65, 75, 89.
162. Id. at 49-53.
163. Id. at 65.
164. Id. at 75.
165. Id. at 89.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 30-31, 48-49.
168. Id. at 173.
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excitement is likely to be perpetrated a group of young, White men
without criminal records who live in a different area from the one in
which the crime occurred. By contrast, perpetrators of reactive
crimes, whose bigotry is more likely to be known, tend to live in the
same area in which the crime was committed. 1
Identifying bias motivation can be further complicated by the
victim's behavior and the inability to use victim testimony as a reli-
able account of the event that transpired. Bias crime identification
may be slowed by victim's refusal or inability to recognize that a
hate crime has occurred.70 Victims may often look to reasons other
than their membership in a particular group to explain their victimi-
zation because if their attack was based on their group identity, they
can do nothing to reduce their chances future victimization. 7' The
typical problems with victim accounts 172 take on heightened impor-
tance when the perpetrator's motivation is a crucial element.'73
In the final analysis, bias crime is an issue marked by serious
disagreements even among right-minded individuals.'74 Saddled
with the task of identifying and classifying these crimes, the police
are often forced to make decisions about whether incidents are hate
crimes or "ordinary crimes." Part III discusses social construction of
organization theory to suggest how the police may make these deci-
sions.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 171.
171. Id. at 171-72.
172. For example, he or she may be mistaken, hold personal biases that affect his or
her judgment, and he or she may have misperceived the incident and may not be able
to give a reliable report.
173. See James B. Jacobs & Jessica S. Henry, The Social Construction of a Hate Crime
Epidemic, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CR]MINOLOGY 366, 384 (1996); see also Susan E. Martin, In-
vestigating Hate Crimes: Case Characteristics and Law Enforcement Responses, 13 JUST. Q.
455, 469 (1996) (reporting that "victims of bias crime reacted more strongly to their
victimization than did victims of comparison crimes").
174. See discussion supra Part II. The Hartford Courant reported a case in which a
group of lesbians were sitting in their apartment when a man on the sidewalk began
shouting, "Dykes get out" and "No more lesbians in Madison." Ellen Nakashwa &
Marisa Osrio Colon, State's Hate Crime Law Brings Few Convictions, HARTFORD
COURANT, July 19, 1993, at Al. He then began to throw beer bottles at them, dislocat-
ing one woman's jaw. Id. Though Wisconsin has a hate crime law, the man was not
charged with a hate crime. Id. The State Attorney justified the inapplicability of the
law, insisting the women (who had traded obscenities with the man and thrown a bag
of trash at him) were not intimidated. Id. Moreover the assistant state attorney said
that while the defendant's language was uncouth, it was not enough to prevail under
the statute. Id.
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III. DECISION MAKING AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
THEORY WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS
Social construction theory appreciates the ambiguities involved
in police interpretation of the law. Social construction theory, as
defined by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, strives to
understand and explain the processes through which social actors
come to view situations as real. It posits that reality is constructed
though the experience of every day life, especially everyday
routines."" Berger and Luckmann assert that institutions have a role
in organizing these routines.' "Institutions...by the very fact of
their existence, control human conduct by sectioning up predefined
patterns of conduct, which channel it in one direction as against the
many other directions that would theoretically be possible."'77 Law
as an institution is well-suited to Berger and Luckmann's social
construction analysis. Like other institutions, law clearly has a
historical process; the parts of the common law in use today
represent the codification of habitual, reciprocal action among
individuals many generations ago.178 Penalties imposed for different
crimes acknowledge the problematic nature of proscribed and
legitimate action. Assigning penalties for legally proscribed conduct,
law accomplishes another task of organizations, it controls human
behavior with preordained modes of behavior that channel conduct
in a single direction. Many generations after the crystallization of
law as an institution and its presentation to us as a set of undeniable
facts, we have been socialized into our roles as citizens under the
law. Law's place in the polity has also been legitimized; legal
principles embodying the law of tort, for example, integrate concepts
of duty and responsibility outside of the law. Finally, law is
integrated with other aspects of social reality.
Berger and Luckmann's analysis can be equally applied to hate
crime legislation, as a category of laws that have been specifically
created through historical, political, and social processes. Moreover,
hate crime laws mandate that penalties are to be applied differently
to different socially constructed groups, groups that Berger and
Luckmann would argue do not require differentiation-or that are
not inherently different-but that society created out of its need for
175. PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY:
A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 19-23 (1967) (offering theory that real-
ity, or that which we cannot wish away, is socially constructed and thus can be
understood by studying the processes through which knowledge is created).
176. Id. at 54.
177. Id. at 55.
178. See id. at 54.
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order.17 The concept of roles and the social distribution of
knowledge partially explains individual disagreement within the
criminal justice system over what constitutes free speech and what
constitutes hate crime. A society's stock of knowledge is structured
into categories defining what is relevant to the specific roles
individuals play.18 Individuals' roles mediate the common stock of
knowledge, and they are inducted only into special areas of socially
objectivated knowledge. "' This implies that the job of hate crime
classification gives police specialized knowledge that theorizing
about constitutional issues may not.
Structuration and practice theories suggest how individuals
within organizations develop specialized knowledge. Contrary to
approaches that view individuals as passive recipients of social
forces or institutions, structuration theories view individuals as
actors who know about social institutions and whose knowledge of
those institutions is highly relevant to their actions.8 2 Envisioning a
reciprocal relationship between individual action and social
institutions, structuration theories strike a balance between the
socially unencumbered vision of individual action in rational choice
models of individual behavior, and the purely structural top down
approaches in which individual structure determines individual
behavior. Structuration theories and practice theories posit that
actors are not cultural dupes yet they cannot completely control
their effect on social institutions. Day-to-day routines constitute the
social institutions the actors had no part in bringing about.'8 3
Giddens' description of the relationship between system,
structure, and structuration is one of complex interaction in which
social systems are composed of regularized relationships between
individuals or practices.'4 Systems have structural properties that
are produced and reproduced via the application of rules and re-
sources to power.15
Applying structuration to police identification and
classification of bias crimes, routines-the everyday practices police
officers employ-help police negotiate myriad incidents of complex
racial conflict, religious conflict and other conflict. As outsiders of
the victim's and perpetrator's community, police use these routines
to classify what is socially constructed and contextually situated as a
racial or religious incident. This "view from nowhere" demands
179. See id. at 51-52.
180. Id. at 76.
181. Id.
182. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE GIDDENS READER 152 (Philip Cassell, ed., 1993).
183. Id. at 141.
184. Id. at 118.
185. Id.
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objectivity in its search for "truth" and may also, over time, expose
the investigator to the subtleties of racial perspective and incidents
poorly captured by the hate crime label--expletives screamed in
anger that surprise the perpetrator as much as victim or bigoted
remarks that will never be hate crimes. A large part of police practice
involves interpreting the stories told by victims and those told by
suspects and situating those stories into a legal framework. This is
no less true of bias crime investigation when police have the job of
weighing the stories told by would-be suspects and victims in order
to discern whether the incident described by the victim fits into the
narrow legal category of bias crime.
Giddens' conception of power--the use of resources to secure
outcomes leading to individuals' ability to intervene in events and
alter their course--may encompass the organizational power police
practices have on the structure of social hierarchy. Police practices
regarding bias crime involve the power to name racial or social real-
ity. Because American society no longer sanctions blatant expres-
sions of racial violence, naming racial and social reality and defining
what counts as racism becomes crucial to the social meaning of
constructs like race and sexuality. The police's role as investigators
and classifiers of hate crimes allows them to insert themselves into
racial and other conflict and pass judgment on what has occurred.
Police officers harness the power of the state, through either the in-
vestigation of White supremacists or through the characterization of
other acts of bias-motivated violence, and thus acquire the power to
define "real" racism, anti-Semitism, and homophobia.86 Over time,
in neighborhoods and small communities, if hate crime persists and
police classification consistently favors one perspective over an-
other, police actions may have the capability to alter the structure of
social conflict and/or social interaction.
IV. POLICE AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAW
A. Maintaining Order and Enforcing the Law
Researchers have described police as "street-level bureau-
crats."187 Like many public servants, police officers interact directly
with citizens and are responsible for the discretionary dispensation
186. The power to define "real" racism is a significant one in a society that punishes
racial discrimination and racial violence. For example, while racial intimidation is
punished, non-racial intimidation has neither a social nor legal sanction. Defining
racial intimidation or violence as non-racial increases its perpetrators' power by defin-
ing their actions as beyond the reach of the law. A full discussion of this issue is unfor-
tunately outside the scope of this Note.
187. See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY at xi (1980).
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of public services.' Because their day-to-day jobs are characterized
by a high degree of discretion and autonomy in organizational ac-
tivities, street-level bureaucrats can determine the amount and
quality of benefits and sanctions to be dispensed to the public.' In
this way, street-level bureaucrats are policy makers. Michael Lipsky
insists that these jobs are marked by large amounts of discretion be-
cause society does not want the rigid application of rules in these
positions.9" While discretion creates flexibility, in environments
with few controls, inadequate resources, and indeterminate objec-
tives, how police officers manage conflicting goals is also political.'9'
For police, the conflicting goals are whether to maintain order or en-
force the law.
The tension between enforcing the law and maintaining order
is well recognized in police-related scholarship.192 "Law and order"
implies rational restraint by the rules to achieve order.9  In other
words, it demands a rigid adherence to the rule of law, with con-
flicts and ambiguities resolved by consultation with the rules
themselves. However, maintaining order in practice often requires
police officers to be given discretion to make decisions and snap
judgments based on their experience of what is required in particu-
lar situations.) 4 For the police, considerations of utility may equal or
188. Id. at 3.
189. Id. at 13.
190. Id. at 23.
191. Id. at 40.
192. See generally EGON BITTNER, ASPECTS OF POLICE WORK 19-28 (1990) (describing
criminal law enforcement, regulatory control, and peacekeeping as overlapping do-
mains of police work); PETER K. MANNING, THE NARC'S GAME: ORGANIZATIONAL AND
INFORMATIONAL LIMITS ON DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT 3-22 (1980) (illustrating narcot-
ics laws' legal mandate that may be at odds with organizational aims); JEROME H.
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 1-22
(1975) (discussing the tension between the rule of law and that which is necessary for
the maintenance of order in a democratic society); JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF
POLICE BEHAVIOR 17-34 (1978) (describing the problem of order in the police working
environment).
193. SKOLNICK supra note 192, at 10-11.
194. See id. at 186-202 (describing how police view the world in probabilistic
terms); see also MANNING, supra note 192, at 79 (describing working agreements and
arrangements made by narcotics officers that contrast with formal state procedures as
attempts to deal with repeating ambiguities and problematic situations); WILSON,
supra note 192, at 84 (describing the decision to arrest as the result of discretionary
balancing of net gains and losses for all parties involved); Egon Bittner, The Police on
Skid Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 AM. SOC. REV. 699, 712 (1967) (describing the
use of law to solve practical problems involved in keeping the peace on skid row);
Richard J. Lundman, Demeanor or Crime? The Midwest City Police-Citizen Encounters
Study, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 631, 647 (1994) (describing extralegal factors, such as de-
meanor which shape the police exercise of discretion); Robert E. Worden, Situational
and Attitudinal Explanations of Police Behaviors: A Theoretical Reappraisal and Empirical
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exceed in importance those of duty or morality, especially for less
serious laws. 9" According to Robert Worden, theories of police be-
havior must:
reflect the ambiguity and uncertainty of the task environ-
ment in which officers work, where formal and informal
rules and procedures are in many cases vague and may
even conflict, characteristics of the incidents into which
they intervene may be variously interpreted, causal con-
nection between actions and outcomes may be unclear,
and the objectives toward which they are expected to di-
rect their efforts are stated in general terms (if at all) and
may be inconsistent.'9'
Their orientation as workers who wish to exercise initiative
suggests the police are more likely to lean toward the arbitrary invo-
cation of order to achieve what they perceive to be the substantive
aims of the criminal law. 97
Police have a duty to enforce the substantive law only when
their behavior conforms to its procedural requirements.198 Total en-
forcement of the law is thus precluded by due process and other
procedural restrictions that ambiguously limit enforcement. 199 Em-
pirical studies of the police have shown that policing is often
extralegal, for while police officers may accept legal constraints,
"they seldom invoke the law in performing police work; informal
action, with or without coercive threats, is commonplace, and hence
the dimensions of police discretion are not delineated only by offi-
cers' authority to apply legal sanctions."200 In the absence of total
enforcement, state statutes and local ordinances often impose on
police officers full enforcement of the law, which includes: 1) investi-
gation of all known violations of criminal law; 2) efforts to discover
perpetrators of crimes; and 3) the presentation of evidence necessary
201for prosecutors to make their cases.
Assessment, 23 L. & SOC'Y REV. 667 (1989) (describing the situational factors that have
an effect on officers decisions to make arrests in traffic stops and disputes).
195. See JEROME SKOLNICK & JAMES FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE
EXCLUSIVE USE OF FORCE 90 (1993) (describing police culture as important to dealing
with the police environment).
196. Worden, supra note 194, at 671.
197. SKOLNICK, supra note 192, at 9, 11; see also Bittner, supra note 194, at 711
(describing the use of law to keep skid row inhabitants from sinking deeper into their
misery).
198. Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 Yale L.J. 543, 554 (1960).
199. Id. at 554-55.
200. Worden, supra note 194, at 668.
201. Goldstein, supra note 198, at 559-60.
[VOL. 2:421
SPRING 1997] Policing Hatred
Though the law imposes full enforcement on police officers,
they may be subject to informal organizational pressures and factors
that provide incentives for minimal compliance with the law. Organ-
izational forces, including procedures, rules and regulations, and
training may discourage compliance; thus, police officers use their
discretion to avoid full enforcement of the laws.212 Police scholars
have observed this decision not to invoke the law in areas such as
writing parking and traffic tickets2w and making arrests."l Unlike the
decisions to invoke the law that get evaluated in criminal proceed-
ings, it is widely accepted that decisions not to invoke the law are of
low visibility2°--they are not available for review either by the pub-
206lic or by superiors within the organizational structure.
Police discretion runs from a variety of sources. Legislatures
delegate discretion to the police through ambiguity in the law.
Discretion also stems come from situational forces 0 or the police
may create it themselves, in order to satisfy personal and
institutional goals. 8 In the case of discretionary opportunities
created within the law, researchers allege that police often infer lack
of legislative desire for enforcement of the laws from statutes with
ambiguous language, and in situations where it appears conduct has
been proscribed: 1) to cure administrative enforcement problems,2°
202. Worden, supra note 194, at 673.
203. See SKOLNICK, supra note 192, at 73; WILSON, supra note 192, at 96-99.
204. WILSON, supra note 192, at 104 (circumscribed enforcement of vice arrests);
Bittner, supra note 194, at 703 ("[Nlot to make an arrest is rarely, if ever, merely a de-
cision not to act; it is most often a decision to act alternatively."). Such decisions not to
invoke the law set the outer limits of law enforcement. See Goldstein, supra note 198, at
543.
205. Id.; see also Wayne R. LaFave, The Police and Non-Enforcement of the Law-Part I,
1962 WIS. L. REV. 104, 126-29 ("[E]ven repeated decisions not to invoke against par-
ticular conduct are apt to go unnoticed."); Worden, supra note 194, at 679 (decisions to
write traffic tickets are low visibility).
206. Goldstein, supra note 198, at 552; see also Bittner, supra note 192, at 110
(contrasting the exhaustive review that follows the challenge of the applicability of
legal norms by prosecutors to the total lack of review of police non-decisions).
207. See, e.g., Worden, supra note 194, at 691 (describing factors like time of shift
and amount of traffic which influence the amount of discretionary time in which to
make suspicious stops).
208. SKOLNICK, supra note 192, at 73; see also AARON V. CICOUREL, THE SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 323 (1968) (describing police officers' identifica-
tion of juveniles as stemming from department policies organizational rules and
codes).
209. Wayne R. LaFave, The Police and Non enforcement of the Law-Part II, 1962 WIS. L.
REV. 179, 191. For example, vagrancy statutes, which prohibit "loitering about without
any means of support," are used by the police for investigation of suspicious charac-
ters rather than for "bums," reflecting police uncertainties or restrictions in the law
regarding the extent to which pre-arraignment detention for purposes of investigation
is proper. Id. at 191-92.
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2) to eliminate loopholes;210 3) to reflect the ideals rather than the
immediate expectations of society 211 or 4) because of legislative
inaction.1 2 In the case of ambiguous language, police are called to
use their discretion to either defer interpretations of the law to other
•• 211
agencies, like prosecutors, or employ strict construction. In the
other categories, often in violation of the letter of the statute, police
exercise their discretion, only invoking laws in the spirit in which
they assume the laws were intended to be enacted; vagrancy laws
may not be enforced against the homeless, gambling between
friends may be allowed, few arrests will be made for adultery, and
obsolete laws will not be enforced.
Police may also use discretion not to invoke the law because,
within the institution, the logic of efficiency supports non-
enforcement when limited resources are allocated to conduct
considered more deserving of official action.1 This may occur in
cases of trivial deviations from the law when an officer believes that
a warning will suffice. Officers may choose not to enforce
particular laws against subgroups in the community because the
proscribed conduct is assumed to be normal."' Non-enforcement
may be elected when the victim does not wish or refuses to aid in
the prosecution of the crime. Officers use their discretion to avoid
invoking the law when invocation might be inappropriate or unfair,
when non-invocation protects public respect and support, when the
cost to the criminal justice system of enforcement outweighs the
210. Id. at 192-93. Included in this category are laws which criminalize gambling.
Id. at 193. Gambling between friends in private residences is technically forbidden for
fear that this loophole would regularly allow the guilty to escape. Id.
211. Id. at 197-99. Generally included in this category are morality and sexual mis-
conduct laws. See id.; see also DAVID H. BAYLEY, FORCES OF ORDER 98-115 (1991)
(discussing the police treatment of so-called "victimless crimes" like gambling, prosti-
tution, the drinking of alcohol, pornography, and drug addiction).
212. Id. at 199. Obsolete laws and Blue laws fall into this category. Id.
213. See SKOLNICK, supra note 192, at 214. Skolnick asserted that police practices to
circumvent the exclusionary rule suggest that there are two types of ambiguities; what
constitutes a legal search and what practices will make behavior have the appearance
of legality. Id. When the line between legality and illegality is fuzzy police justify a
contention of legality regardless of the actual circumstances. Id. For a discussion of
situational and attitudinal explanations of police behavior, see Worden, supra note
194, at 671.
214. Id. at 673.
215. LaFave, supra note 209, at 204; see also WILSON, supra note 192, at 84 ("[Flor
most officers there are considerations of utility that equal or exceed in importance
those of duty or morality, especially for the more common and less serious laws.").
216. WILSON, supra note 192, at 225-26, 297-99 (citing officers' belief that assault
laws should not be enforced in the Black community because Blacks normally settle
disputes violently). Wilson also finds a similar distributive injustice leading to non-
enforcement among police officers. Id. at 37-39; see LaFave supra note 209, at 210.
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benefits of non-enforcement 217 and when invocation of the law
causes more harm to a victim and outweighs the loss sustained from
the risk of non-enforcement.2 8
B. Police Discretion and Hate Crimes
Discretion is problematic in the hate crime context. First, street
level enforcers of hate crime have the power to effectively nullify
hate crime statutes through non-enforcement, thereby reducing
them to an empty symbolic gesture. 9 Second, the most controversial
use of police discretion has involved discrimination based on race,
gender, and sexual orientation.22' Thus, there is a legitimate cause for
concern about the effective enforcement of bias crime laws designed
to help these groups.22' For hate crimes, non-enforcement of the law
could be measured in one of two ways; either by identifying politi-
cally protected expression as bias crime (or evidence of bias
motivation) or by failing to classify as bias crimes those which show
bias motivation. It is in the latter area of much lower visibility that
the literature on police discretion and non-enforcement of the law
raises by implication several questions for the police enforcement of
bias crimes law, especially in light of the ambiguity embodied in
these laws.22 Salient inquiries in this vein include the following: Are
217. See SKOLNICK, supra note 192, at 125 (describing how police ignore narcotics
informants' use of drugs because the benefits outweigh the cost of non-enforcement);
see also Lundman, supra note 194, at 648 (noting a failure to enforce laws against pub-
lic drunkenness and speeding because usually individual violators were a minor
problem that would often correct itself). LaFave claimed that in some cases, such as
instances in which subjecting conduct to the criminal process would be ineffective or
inappropriate, the police would not fully enforced the law even if sufficient resources
existed. LaFave, supra note 209, at 217-38.
218. WILSON, supra note 192, at 216-29.
219. See Samuel Walker & Charles M. Katz, Less than Meets the Eyes: Police Depart-
ment Bias-Crime Units, 14 AM. J. OF POLICE 29, 32 (1995).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. For a description of ambiguity in hate crime law and its impact on the police,
see JAMES GAROFALO & SUSAN E. MARTIN, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, BIAS-MOTIVATED CRIMES: THEIR CHARACTERISTICS AND THE LAW EN-
FORCEMENT RESPONSE 49 (1993) (describing ambiguity inherent in those cases in
which bias is a motivation); Alison Mitchell, Police Find Bias Crimes Are Often Wrapped
in Ambiguity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1992, at B2; Revision to Hate Crimes Law is Offered;
But Debate Over Gays Might Kill Movement To Clarify Statute, AUSTIN AM. STATESMEN,
Apr. 2, 1995, at B1 (describing law enforcement officers' reluctance to use a "loosely
defined" Texas hate crime law and chance having a conviction overturned on consti-
tutional grounds); Rhonda Smith, Protection from Hate Crimes on Gay Agenda, AUSTIN
AM. STATESMAN, Jan. 18, 1995, at B3 (describing a year old hate crime law that does
not mention specific racial or minority groups and the difficulty in enforcing such an
ambiguous law).
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bias crimes an area in which police have discretion? If so, do they
use it to not enforce the law? If the police do not enforce these laws,
why not? For example, is bias crime legislation not enforced because
statutory ambiguity leads police officers to think that bias crime
laws are "feel-good" laws that legislators do not really want en-
forced? Is police non-enforcement localized and geared to certain
situations (e.g., cases involving violence against Asian Americans)
that they feel are less of a problem in order to conserve scarce re-
sources? Does victims' reluctance to prosecute play a role in the
non-enforcement of hate crime legislation? Finally, do police pursue
non-enforcement because they do not really think these actions are
crimes? The empirical research on the police identification of hate
crime provides answers to some of these questions.
The existing studies on police and bias crime suggest that this
statutory ambiguity is often dealt with through specialization and
development of elaborate procedure. 3 In what appears to be an ex-
treme effort to comply with state laws, police departments around
the country have devoted special units to bias crime investigation
rather than not enforcing ambiguous bias crime laws.224 According to
the Justice Department's Bureau of Justice Statistics, there are over
350 specialized units devoted to bias crimes.225 Similar to specialized
units created to address enforcement problems, such as gangs,
drugs, or vice, most of these units are responsible for investigating
crimes that patrol officers have identified as possibly bias-
motivated.2
In order to circumvent low-level enforcers' discretion in the
classification of bias crime, many police departments have created
standard operating procedures.2 In most cases this means that all
223. However, some laws may pose too many enforcement challenges. See sources
describing the Texas hate crime law, supra note 222.
224. See Walker & Katz, supra note 219, at 29 (survey finding a variety of written
procedures and organizational structures in departments reporting bias units to the
Department of Justice in 1990).
225. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS, 1993: DATA FOR INDIVIDUAL STATE
AND LOCAL AGENCIES WITH 100 OR MORE OFFICERS (1995) (survey of police depart-
ments with 100 officers or more that describes specialized units).
226. See Walker & Katz, supra note 219, at 30.
227. See generally Brian Levin, Bias Crimes: A Theoretical & Practical Overview, 4
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 165 (1992/1993) (review of police bias crime procedures in
Boston); Levin & McDevitt, supra note 54, at 166 (reviewing hate crime policy at the
Baltimore County Police Department); Susan E. Martin, A Cross-Burning is Not Just An
Arson: Police Social Construction of Hate Crimes in Baltimore County, 33 CRIMINOLOGY
303 (1995) (reviewing special bias crime procedures in Baltimore County, MD); Chuck
Wexler & Gary J. Marx, When Law and Order Works: Boston's Innovative Approach to the




uniformed members of the service are given special procedures to
follow in the event that there are signs the crime they are
investigating is bias-motivated. The procedures tell officers what to
do and provides a list of suggested criteria designed to help officers
discern whether a particular incident is motivated by racial, ethnic,
religious, or any other element of a ist of forbidden prejudices.228
Though in most departments the suggested criteria is scarcely a
formula or prolix code , the use of these procedures suggests that
those promulgating the rules believe that the procedures help
officers separate bias from non-bias crimes.
In New York, if bias motivation is suspected, the officer is
required to notify his patrol supervisor, the desk officer, and his
commanding officer of the unit.20 The commanding officer then
decides whether the bias unit should investigate the crime. If the
Bias Incident Investigating Unit is called in, the incident gets logged
as a "possibly bias-motivated" incident.231 The Bias Unit can either
take control of the investigation or participate jointly. with detective
personnel in investigating the crime and making a definitive
classification of the incident.2 2 In the course of their investigation,
officers interview eyewitnesses and victims, the perpetrator's family
and check out his past affiliations. They will no doubt think about
the day on which this crime occurred to see if it could have triggered
bias-motivated violence. Police search the crime scene for clues to a
perpetrator's motivation until they find anything that confirms or
disproves the crime was racially motivated. For example, if police
discover a perpetrator had prior connections to a racist organization,
or if he acted differently toward the Black and White victims of the
crime or said anything racist during the crime, this could serve as
evidence that the crime was racially-motivated. Their investigation
of bias crime requires police to weigh stories told by victims and
those by perpetrators, sifting through different versions of an event
colored by perspective, self-interest, anger, fear, and outrage. Like all
police investigations, classifying bias crime is like putting together a
puzzle, fitting each piece together into a recognizable picture.
228. See id.
229. See, e.g., NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEP'T, NEW YORK CITY PATROL GUIDE, at
108-26 (unpublished document on file with author) ("The mere mention of a bias re-
mark does not necessarily make an incident bias-motivated just as the absence of a
bias remark does not make an incident non-bias. A common sense approach should be
applied and the totality of the circumstances should be reviewed before any decision is
made.") (emphasis added).
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The creation of specialized units and standard operating proce-
dures like the above are designed to limit police discretion by
providing a forum for internal review for the classification deci-
sion. 213 Many bias units have mechanisms for re-examining bias
investigation and classification. In New York, for example, once the
initial report has been made indicating that a crime may involve bias
motivation, the failure to classify can be reviewed and reversed by
unanimous decision of the Bias Review Panel that meets with the
commander of the Bias Unit regularly.3 In Baltimore, individual
beat officers, precinct supervisors and Community Service Officers
(CSOs) are all responsible for the investigation and classification of
incidents motivated by race, religion and ethnicity.2 35 Though their
approach to classifying cases is somewhat decentralized, the de-
partment has devised two monitoring systems. First, all cases are
reviewed and classified as verified, unverified or "unfounded" at
monthly meetings attended by investigators and supervisors from
the Community Relations Division, a representative from the state
Human Relations Commission, the County Executive's minority
affairs specialist and at least one precinct Community Service Offi-
cer.2 6 There is also an internal monitoring system within the
Community Relations Division which maintains close ties with the
community and each precinct's CSO and is responsible for verifica-
tion and statistical record-keeping. It is important to note that,
despite monitoring systems like those in New York and Baltimore,
patrol officers' decisions not to classify incidents as bias crimes are
unlikely to be reviewed except perhaps by the press.
Generally, empirical studies of police departments in the area
of bias crime have summarized police procedures in the area of bias
crime and compared the characteristics of bias and non-bias-
motivated crimes.2 - Because it fails to examine how bias crime pro-
cedures work on the ground or how police actually implement the
law, current bias crime research cannot address the critic's argument
233. Brian Levin maintains that specialized units are created to take discretion
away from patrol officers who are the least trained and most cynical about bias
crimes. Levin, supra note 227, at 173. He cites a study done by Jack McDevitt in which
only 19 of 452 crimes eventually classified as bias-motivated were reported as bias
incidents by the responding officer. Id. He suggests large-scale misidentification by
patrol officers results from their training to identify crimes based on the severity of the
injury rather than underlying causes. Id.
234. Jacobs, supra note 149, at 57.
235. Martin, supra 173, at 461.
236. Id. at 462.
237. Id.
238. See generally GAROFALO & MARTIN, supra note 222 (examining New York City
and Baltimore County police department practices in the area of bias crime and de-
scribing the nature of bias-motivated crimes vis vis "other" crimes and basic law
enforcement procedures, including response to victims).
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regarding the highly subjective nature of bias crime classification
and, consequently, the possibility that police discretion may allow
the police to intrude on politically protected rights.
Current police bias crime practices must be studied to define
properly the impact of hate crime legislation. The level of discretion
in identification and classification of hate crimes differs
substantially from discretion in other areas in that bias incidents
have the potential to have extremely high visibility and extremely
low visibility. Hate crime identification differs from enforcement of
traffic laws, for example, because it can occur under intense public
scrutiny. 9 Even if the crime is not reported by the media, other
members of the community are likely to know of the crime and
pressure police for a bias or non-bias classification.. By contrast,
with hate crimes not reported to the media and those of which
ethnic communities are unaware, there may be extremely low
visibility, accompanied by a lack of oversight, as patrol officers fail
to identify incidents motivated by bias because of informal
departmental norms. These norms may result from pressure within
the department to avoid classifying incidents as bias crimes. These
pressures may be caused by external forces, like local political
leaders who fear that hate crime data may portray their city as "the
most bigoted city in America." 24 1
V. OFFICIAL PROCEDURE AND EVERYDAY PRACTICES IN THE
CONSTRUCTION OF "TRUTH"
In the absence of concrete evidence, the vagueness of police
guidelines like those listed above suggests that those guidelines are
not what direct the evaluation of hundreds of bias cases each year.242
The sheer enormity of the task suggests that police officers must
have developed organizational routines that aid in their day-to-day
classification. The empirical literature on police decision-making
and hate crime identification suggests that routines make it easier
for police officers to identify evidence of racial, ethnic, religious, and
239. Wexler & Marx, supra note 227 (describing the publicity given to racial vio-
lence).
240. Jacobs & Fisher, supra note 219, at 113 (describing excoriation by the press,
protests and demonstrations that may result from police officers' failure to classify an
incident as a hate crime). Jacobs fails to acknowledge that identification of an incident
as a hate crime may produce similar pressures and changes in procedure.
241. Id.
242. From the New York Bias Unit's inception until 1994, the Bias Unit reviewed or
investigated over 10,000 possible bias-motivated cases, 5981 of which were eventually
classified as bias-motivated. NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEP'T, BIAS INCIDENT
INVESTIGATING UNIT ANNUAL REPORT (1994) (unpublished document on file with the
author).
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other bias-motivated conflict. Routines prescribe how and under
what circumstances police officers will ascribe a prejudiced motiva-
tion to a crime. Within the police world, this work of classifying bias
crime is called "investigation," implying that when they get "to the
bottom of the crime" they have found, rather than constructed, the
truth.243 One possible description of the relationship between official
procedure and every day practices in the identification of bias
crimes, informed in part by Susan Shapiro's study of fact-checkers
in newsmagazines, is that the chance and cost of error results in
rigid adherence to the rules."' In her five week observation of fact-
checkers for three national newsweeklies, Shapiro discovered a
methodology of checking facts grounded in definitions of "facts"
and "errors" used by these researchers. The impossibility of omnis-
cience and the inevitability of error, according to Shapiro, resulted in
the differentiation among fact checkers between "inside" errors,
which can be detected and "outside" errors which could not have
been seen from their particular vantage point.24s This "perverse" ori-
entation, Shapiro alleges, results in a situation in which fact checkers
become more procedure-oriented than outcome oriented.2 6 The
"truth" mattered less than whether they followed the rules for veri-
fication.
Applying Shapiro's study to police truth construction suggests
that everyday routines among the police may involve the use of
official procedure in a way that those creating it never intended. In
Shapiro's study, the rules for verification were intended to make
sure that the source was "correct." In practice, however, rules were
used to justify a result. The existing literature on the relationship
between official procedure and bias crimes fails to answer several
questions. Many questions remain regarding officers' use of
departmental lists of criteria. Do officers use the criteria as a
checklist? Or do they decide whether a crime was bias-motivated
and then use the language of the criteria in their reports? If they do
use the criteria as a justification for what they have already decided,
243. Unlike other crimes, in bias crimes the ambiguity of perspective and the im-
portance of context may make truth construction a much more appropriate label than
"investigation."
244. Susan P. Shapiro, This Paper Has Not Been Fact Checked! A Study of Fact Checking
in American Magazines, WORKING PAPER, GANNET CENTER FOR MEDIA STUDIES (1990).
For a discussion of how criminal justice personnel construct truth, see CICOUREL,
supra note 208, at 111-69 (explaining police officers' construction of juvenile
delinquents from organizational objectification and verification procedures); Lisa
Frohmann, Discrediting Victim's Allegations of Sexual Assault: Prosecutorial Accounts of
Case Rejections, 38 SOC. PROB. 213 (1991) (describing how prosecutors decide when a
rape case is "real").
245. Shapiro, supra note 244, at 23.
246. Id. at 24.
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whom do they use it for? Their bosses? Prosecutors? To protect
themselves from lawsuits? What happens in cases when they do not
use procedure? Answers to these questions may distill whether the
procedure creates the practice or practice developed as a result of the
officers' inability to use or their distaste for official procedure.
CONCLUSION
This Note is part of a larger observational study of the police
and bias crime classification. Police investigation and classification
of hate crimes raises important legal and policy questions, not just
regarding how police officers as individuals within organizations
manage discretion, but also concerning ground-level enforcers' un-
derstanding of laws, the practical implementation of the law on the
books, and the efficacy of law as a solution to a problem as difficult
as hate crime. Thus, research into the police methods of classifica-
tion has several implications. It may provide evidence that will
allow us to reassess the normative and practical value of the discre-
tion given to street-level bureaucrats like the police. Such police
discretion is most often associated with police use of illegally-seized
evidence and violations of due process rights because officers are
often faced with the tension between maintaining order and violat-
ing legal procedural safeguards. The study currently being
conducted may show that police discretion is well placed in the area
of hate crimes and that maintaining order and enforcing the law are
not always antithetical. Hate crime classification may require such a
high degree of individual-level decision-making that statutory clas-
sification of bias crime is neither feasible nor just. Thus, unlike the
Fourth Amendment, hate crime may be an area where enforcing the
law and maintaining procedural protection are consistent.
Police methods of bias crime classification have much to say
about study of law in general and hate crime laws specifically.
Though the Supreme Court has settled the constitutionality of bias
crime statutes, bias crimes remain at the intersection of protected
speech and unprotected action. Much disagreement in the legal
community remains regarding the proper boundaries of what may
be considered evidence of bias motivation. This requires the police
enforcing bias crime laws to interpret the First Amendment. Mean-
ingful differences between legal interpretation of bias crime
legislation, the First Amendment, and police practices may reinforce
the idea, at least in the area of hate crimes, that police play much
more than a ministerial role in enforcing the law. As a result, judges
and lawyers are not the only actors within the criminal justice sys-
tem with powers of definitive interpretation of the First
Amendment. Police classification in this area therefore provides
commentary both on the appropriate role for the police both within
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the criminal justice system and how law works on the ground. Po-
lice officers' interpretations in this area matter, not only in the
critical role they play in screening the disputes that come to court,
but also in their ability to decide when hate is a crime.
Finally, questioning the enforcement of hate crime law may tell
us something about whether hate crime law is effective. This is im-
portant because a number of agencies report that while crime in this
country is decreasing, hate-motivated violence has grown to epi-
demic levels and is increasing.247 By examining the police
enforcement of hate crime legislation, we can learn whether police
practices effectively address manifestations of bias-motivated vio-
lence. Similarly, by closely examining police enforcement in this
area, studies of the police may raise questions about whether hatred
is an area that the law can police and whether bias crime legislation
is the proper vehicle.
247. See LEVIN & MCDEVITr, supra note 54 (describing the coming crisis and a rising
tide of bigotry); ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 17 (citing rise in anti-Semitic
incidents); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 9 (reporting increase in
hate crimes nationwide); S. POVERTY LAW CENTER, supra note 17 (citing rise in violence
perpetrated by hate groups). But see Jacobs & Henry, supra note 173 (arguing that the
hate crime epidemic has been socially constructed by the media and victims' advocacy
groups).
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